Dollar Clamp for Beginners

Authors

  • Santiago Mosquera Universidad de San Andrés
  • Federico Sturzenegger Universidad de San Andrés

Keywords:

Dollar Clamp, Imports , Exports, Pesos, Distortions

Abstract

This paper models the effects of restrictions on access to the foreign exchange market known as the “dollar clamp” (capital controls). In our modeling, the dollar clamp operates in two ways. On the one hand, as a tax on exports combined with a subsidy on imports, on the other hand, as a mechanism to encourage the holding of pesos. The model replicates the movements observed in the exchange rate gap, prices, activity and exports that are observed when installing or lifting a dollar clamp. The common element in all the specifications analyzed is that dollar clamp produces welfare-reducing distortions.

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Published

2021-12-31

How to Cite

Mosquera, S. ., & Sturzenegger, F. . (2021). Dollar Clamp for Beginners. Desarrollo Económico. Revista De Ciencias Sociales, 61(234), 101–124. Retrieved from https://revistas.ides.org.ar/desarrollo-economico/article/view/165

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Section

Papers