¿Hay aquí una paradoja? Recurrencia y funcionalidad del populismo en Argentina
Comentario al artículo de Gerchunoff, Rapetti y de León, “La Paradoja populista”
Keywords:
Argentina, Populism, Economic Policy, Distributive ConflictAbstract
This commentary on the piece by Gerchunoff, Rapetti and de León discusses the main assumptions underpinning their conceptualization of economic populism, and the consequences of those assumptions for their analysis of populism in Argentina. It argues that those assumptions are untenable, insofar as they omit consideration of sociological, political, and political economy issues already established, both theoretically and empirically, in the literature. It also criticizes the analysis of populism for setting aside precisely some of those issues that, according to the evidence available in the literature, have also been established as central.
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